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TRAINING, FIRING TAXES AND WELFARE 
 
Andrea Ricci 






This paper shows  that the distortion of privately provided training caused by 
hold up an justify the introduction of positive firing tax in economies populated by 
risk neutral or perfectly  insured agents.  More precisely we highlight two results. 
First,  an  efficient  economic  policy,  which  makes  use  of  a  small  lay-off  tax  and 
hiring  subsidies,  always  increases  employment,  productivity  and  the  welfare  of 
unemployed  workers.  Second,  with  no  hiring  subsidies,  the  relationship  between 
firing penalties and welfare depends on the returns to training. In this case, if returns 
to training are high enough, the introduction of a small firing tax causes an increase 






















Employment protection has been analysed intensely  in last decade, 
a  period  during  which  a  number  of  European  countries  have 
experienced labour market reforms aimed at reducing the rigidity of 
employment  relationships.  Most  contributions  have  considered 
employment protection as a cost incurred by firms, and the focus has 
been on employment dynamics and unemployment duration. 
 Among these, Bentolila and Bertola (1990) have established the 
opposite mechanisms through which firing costs prevent layoffs and 
discourage  hiring,  with  ambiguous  overall  impact  on  employment. 
Mortensen  and  Pissarides  (1999),  also,  discuss  the  implications  of 
firing costs in a search and matching framework, with similar results 
the level of firing taxes reduces the inflows into unemployment and 
increases  the  average  duration  of  unemployment,  because  of  their 
negative impact on the propensity to hire unemployed workers.  
Other papers related to the relationship between labour market flow 
and  jobs  security  provisions  reach  the  same  conclusions 
(Garibaldi,1997;  Hopenhayn  and  Rogerson,1998;  Cauch  and 
Zylberberg,  1999;  Garibaldi  and  Violante,  2002  ).  Employment 
protection,  however,  affects  human  capital  accumulation,  labour 
productivity and welfare, not only labour market flows. For instance, 
firing taxes may stimulate productivity growth because it increases job 
tenures and favours on-the-job training, as pointed out by Nickell and 
Layard (1999).  
The aim of this paper is to tackle this issue by using a discrete-time 
matching model a la Mortensen-Pissarides’ (1994), where the firms 
finance training of their employees. A search and matching framework 
seems a useful tool to treat problems involving rent sharing caused by 
private investment, and allows us to consider alternative wage setting 
institutions to model both flexible and rigid labour markets. 
 The  crucial  assumption  is  that  training  cannot  be  contracted 
between  firms  and  workers,  because  of  the  unverifiable  and 
unenforceable  nature  of    firm  specific  training.  The  contractual 
incompleteness implies, in turn, a moral hazard on the firm’s side, as 
firms maximize their expected profits without considering the share of 
initial cost sustained by the workers, through a wage cut for newly 
hired workers.  
The  consequent  under-investment  equilibrium  causes  excessive 
layoffs  and  lower  job  creation,  higher  unemployment  and  lower  
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welfare  with  respect  to  socially  optimal  allocation.  Wage 
renegotiation  does  not  eliminate  this  inefficiency  because  of  the 
timing of events. The amount of training is chosen in first stage of 
employment relation, while the returns to investment are realized at 
second stage.  
Thus workers are not able to affect the amount of training, which is 
chosen  unilaterally  by  firms.  In  such  a  context,  an  increase  in  job 
security reduces turnover and induces  more training, increasing the 
privately chosen level towards the social efficient level. This causes 
increased  market  tightness  and  reduced  layoff  rates  when  hiring 
subsidies  are  introduced  in  a  equilibrium  budget  constraint  regime. 
Differently, when employment protection is pure waste and there are 
no hiring subsidies, the impact of firing taxes on welfare depends on 
the elasticity of training function, even though it continues to favour 
insider workers by increasing their wages and job durations.   
There are a number of contributions related to our model. In the 
paper of Boone, Belot and van Ours (2002) employment protection 
strengthens the incentives of workers to invest in human capital in 
order to reduce the probability of being fired so that, when the firm 
offers a contract with high separation costs, it commit itself to a stable 
employment relationship. 
 Conversely, our discrete dynamic matching model introduces the 
additional  decision  margin  about  training  investment  on  the  firms’ 
side,  rather  than  discussing  the  effort  choice  of  workers.  And  the 
emphasis is on hold up problem associated with the firms’ provision 
of training, the amount of which is determined on the basis of future 
returns, not on the suitability of the workers.  
This  apparently  minor  change  resolves  significant  theoretical 
problems  with  the  model  of  Boone,  Belot  and  van  Ours.    In  their 
model, an efficient outcome can be obtained if the worker buys the 
firm.  The firm can achieve higher returns by selling itself, on credit, 
to  the  worker  resolving  any  possible  problems  with  liquidity 
constraints. 
 The analogous solution in our model would be for the worker to 
sell himself to the firm, or at least make himself an indentured servant. 
This is obviously illegal.  Thus our model obtains results which are 
robust to consideration of innovative contractual arrangements due to 
the inalienability of human capital. 
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), also, analyse the under investment 
due to hold up in a search environment and examine how markets can  
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internalise  the  resulting  externalities.  In  particular,  Acemoglu  and 
Shimer first show that the equilibrium is always inefficient when firms 
make ex ante investments before matching with workers and wages 
are  determined  by  ex  post  bargaining.  Either  wages  increase  with 
output,  creating  a  hold  up  problem,  or  all  the bargaining  power  is 
vested in the firms, leading to very low wage levels and excessive 
entry of firms. 
Then,  an  economy  where  firms  post  wages  and  workers  direct 
search towards more capital intensive jobs is examined, establishing  
that in this case the equilibrium is efficient, a result in striking contrast 
with  a  traditional  conjecture  in  the  hold-up  literature  (Williamson, 
1985). In our model jobs do not differ in terms of physical capital 
investment but in human capital accumulation.  
This feature allows to discuss the hold up implications on labour 
market  outcomes  without  assuming  that  firms’  investment  are 
financed  before  the  match  is  formed.  The  unverifiable  nature  of 
training causes a contractual incompleteness even after the employer 
and  employee  meet,  which  makes  the  inefficient  not  dependent  on 
search frictions.  
Thus, contractual incompleteness is of a different kind than that 
considered by Acemoglu and Shimer. Furthermore, we use a search 
and  bargaining  model  in  which  equilibrium  is  efficient  for  an 
appropriate bargaining solution (Hosios’ condition) and highlight the 
role  of  employment  protection  to  ameliorate  the  inefficient  private 
provision  of  training,  moving  its  level  toward  the  social  optimum. 
That  is,  our  emphasis  is  on  hold  up  and  how  this  implies  that 
employment  protection  can  be  welfare  enhancing,  not  on  search 
externalities 
1.  
Finally, the firm specific capital literature also makes the point that 
training  investments  are  positively  related  to  job  tenure  (Lazear, 
1979).  Hence  employment  protection  is  supposed  to  increase  the 
welfare  of  employed  workers  in  terms  of  wage  growth  and  lower 
unemployment  incidence,  as  well  to  hurt  unemployed  workers 
because of higher unemployment duration. Empirical evidence in this 
                                                 
1 A key result of this paper, the under investment in private provision of training, has also a similar intuition to Grout (1984), who 
pointed out that there will be inefficiently low investment in presence of rent-sharing. In Grout (1984) firms invest directly and 





perspective are Topel (1991), Abraham and Farber (1987), Antonji 
and  Sakoto,  (1997).  Nevertheless,  none  of  these  papers  explicitly 
investigate the role of job security provisions on returns to tenure, a 
focus that allows us to obtain no standard conclusion.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic 
theoretical  framework  and  Section  3  focuses  on  the  labour  market 
equilibrium  and  its  inefficient  properties  in  terms  of  training 
investment and separation rate. Section 4 analyses the role of firing 
taxes to reduce hold up problem in the private provision of training 
and to increase the welfare of unemployed workers, when different 
design of  public policy are concerned. Section 5 provides a numerical 
exercise. Finally section 6 concludes. The appendix contains proofs. 
 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
The economy is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral workers 
and risk-neutral firms. Each group has mass 1 and lives infinitely. All 
agents discount the future at the exogenous rate r, which is strictly 
positive, and enjoy the consumption of the only good of this economy. 
Time is discrete. 
Firms post vacancies at a cost k per period while workers supply 
labour inelastically and search with fixed intensity. The number of 
workers and firms that match is determined by a matching function 
) , ( v u m ,  where  u  is  the  number 
of  unemployed  workers,  v  is  the 
number of vacancies and the ratio 
u
v
= !  is the market tightness. Then 
the  transition  rate  facing  the  firms  to  match  with  an  unemployed 
worker  is  ) ( ) , 1 ( ! ! m m = ,  while  the  probability  of  an  unemployed 
worker to find a job is  ) ( ) 1 , (
1 ! ! ! m m =
" . The faction  )) , 1 ( 1 ( ! m " of 
workers  that  are  not  matched  stay  unemployed  and  do  not  receive 
unemployment benefits.  Workers are ex-ante homogenous in terms of 
ability .  
Upon matching, the employment relation is formalized through a 
two stage structure, to highlight firms’ incentives to train in the early 
period  of  their  employees’  career.  In  the  first  stage,  the  initial 
productivity of a matched worker is equal to the expected value of the 
idiosyncratic  productivity  ! ,  distributed  according  to  a  continuous  
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and  differentiable  function  ) (! F   over  the  finite  support  ] , [ U L ! !   : 
e E y ! ! = = ) ( 0 . In addition, firms can train  employees, to increase the 
future productivity of the match. In the model training is firm specific 
in the sense that the worker cannot use his skills with any other firm 
so workers can bargain over its returns
2. The cost of training is linear 
and  is  incurred  in  terms  of  lower  output  in  the  first  period  of  the 
match:  h h c = ) (  where h  is the amount of training.  
The  returns  of  training  are  realized  only  at  second  stage  of  the 
employment relationship and are defined by a differentiable function, 
) (h f , with positive and decreasing marginal returns, i.e.  0 ) (
' > h f  
and  0 ) (
' ' < h f . To find a parametric specification of the equilibrium 
we  also  assume  that  training  returns  equal  to 
! ah h f = ) (   ,  where 
0 > a   is  an  efficiency  parameter  and  1 0 < <!     guarantees  the 
concavity of the function.  
At  the  second  stage  the  returns  of  training  are  realized,  if  the 
worker-employer  pair  is  not  dissolved.  Then  the  employment 
relationship enter into a “insider” phase, where the pair’s output is 
increased by the returns of training, i.e: 
! " ah y + = 1 . Additive returns 
of training simplify analysis without affecting the results; moreover, 
they highlight that firm-sponsored training does not arise because of 
complementary between training and match specific productivity (see 
Acemoglu and Pischke,1999). 
At the start of second stage it may be that workers and firms decide 
to split up if the idiosyncratic productivity of the match is too low. In 
such a case the firm pays a firing cost  to the state and return on the 
labour market to fill a new vacancy position, while workers become 
unemployed.  When  the  employment  relationship  survives  until  the 
“insider” phase, the match is no longer subject to productivity shocks, 
but expires only if worker retires from the labour market, an event 
which happens with probability s each period, with  1 0 < < s .  
In  the  economy  employment  protection  is  defined  as  firing 
restrictions imposed by the government on the firms when matches are 
                                                 
2 As Becker (1964) pointed out, certain investment go into specific capital committing the firm to irreversible expenditure that 
only have value in the context of the relationship between the employer and employee, who share the benefits of its investments 




3. The tax paid on separation, T , is not a compensation given 
to the worker but a loss borne entirely by the firm. Firms can also 
receive an exogenous amount of hiring subsidy each time a worker is 
hired,  ! .  In  modelling  these  policy  interventions we  consider  two 
alternatives.  In  the  first  case  the  amount  of  hiring  subsidies  are 
determined  by  the  equilibrium  budget  constraint  and  compensate 
exactly  the  cost  of  separation  sustained  by  firms.  Thus  no  fiscal 
externalities arise in equilibrium. In the second  there are no hiring 
subsidies, the public financing constraint does not matter and firing 
costs are interpreted as pure waste from social point of view. 
 
2.1 Asset values 
 
Consider  the  asset  value  equations  that  characterize  firms  and 
workers.  Let  ) , ( 0 h J
e !   be  the  expected  present  value  of  the  profit 
from a position filled as an entry level job,  ) , ( 1 h J !  the value of a 
regular job to the firm, and V  value of a vacancy to the firms: 
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Entry  level  and  regular  jobs  differ  in  terms  of  profit  flows  and 
capital  gains  due  to  the  layoff  option.  The  flow  profits  in  (1)  are 
reduced by the cost of training, while in (2) they are augmented by 
return of investments done at previous stage. Besides in equation (1) 
                                                 
3  In reality employment protection regulation has other components to be considered, such as severance payments and experience 
rating. Severance payments is a pure transfer in wage bargaining, so that it only reduces the equilibrium wage rate without 
affecting the unemployment rate (Lazear, 1990; for some different result see Garibaldi and Violante, 2002 ). This neutrality result 
explains our choice to focus on the effect of firing costs on labour market outcomes. Exclusion of  experience rating analysis is 




the firm receives a hiring subsidy !  when the worker arrives and the 
job is created, independently from the training decision. In the second 
stage the subsidy is zero. The integral term of equation (1) reflects the 
expected  value of the match to the firms when the match survives, 
while if it is dissolved the firm pays the firing costs and returns to the 
market with a new vacancy. Regular jobs do not present this option 
value because, the productivity of the match remains constant, if the 
workers do not retire. 
Analogously,  let  ) , ( 0 h E
e ! denotes  the  expected  present  value  of 
workers’ utility,  ) , ( 1 h E !  the value of being employed in a regular job 
and  U     the  value  of  being  unemployed.  These  asset  values  are 
described respectively by:   
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Note  that  the  expected  lifetime  utility  of  unemployed  workers, 
equation (6), may be considered a welfare measure if the economy is 
initially characterized by high unemployment rate (see Blanchard and 
Lendier, 2002).  
 
2.2. Wage negotiation and Hold up 
 
In the search equilibrium literature wage determination is typically 
assumed to be perfectly flexible and fixed through a generalized Nash 
bargaining game (Mortensen, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998). 
A bilateral cooperative bargaining is also assumed in our model. In the 
first period wage is determined according to a  Nash rule in which 
firing penalties are not binding, hiring subsidies are distributed to the 
firms and the cost of training is shared with workers. Then, workers  
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and  firms  agree  over  the    initial  wage  according  to  the  following 
sharing rule:  
 
(7) 
! ! " # " " ] ) , ( [ ] ) , ( max[ arg ) , ( 0
1
0 0 U h E V h J h w
e e e $ + $ =
$  
 
where  parameter  !   represents  the  workers’  bargaining  power, 
assumed  constant  in  both  stages  of  employment  relationship. 
Employment protection do not enter the negotiation as the outsider 
worker is not eligible by law and firms are not constrained to pay 
firing costs in case of disagreement during negotiation. After having 
substituted correspondent asset values we derive the equilibrium wage 
for “outsider” workers :  
 
(7’)  U T h h w
e e ) 1 ( ) ( ) , ( 0 ! ! " # ! # $ + $ + $ =    
 
Conversely,  once  the  employer-employee  pair  enter  into  second 
stage, job termination policies affect the pairs’ threat point because 
firing  costs  have  to  be  paid  by  firms  upon  separations.  The 
cooperative bargaining game in second stage entails : 
 
(8) 
! ! " " " ] ) , ( [ ] ) , ( [ arg ) , ( 1
1
1 1 U h E T V h J Max h w # + # =
#    
 
which implies the equilibrium wage for insider workers: 
 
(8’)  U s r T s r ah h w ) 1 )( ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( 1 ! ! " ! "
# $ + + + + + =   
 
It is straightforward to note that the cost of training reduces the 
initial wage, because it is conditional on agreement to form the match 
and hence must be shared. But once the job becomes regular such a 
cost is sunk and does not influence the wage. The firing tax represents 
an employer liability if the job is destroyed once the match survives at 
second  stage,  implying  a  higher  wage.  Finally  the  outside  wage 
increases by a fraction of the hiring subsidy because the payment of 
the subsidy is conditional on the worker’s agreement to accept the job 
offer;  in  contrast,  the  insider  wage  is  independent  of  the  hiring 
subsidy, since it has already been received. This higher expected wage 
for trained generates a downward pressure on the initial wage. The 
wage  schedule  (7’)-(8’)  implies  an  hold  up  problem  in  the  private  
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provision  of  training,  though  the  perfect  flexibility  hypothesis  for 
newly  hired  workers  allows  the  firms  to  share  a  fraction  of  their 
training costs with employees. Hold up arises because the nature of 
firm specific human capital impedes the firms to commit to a wage-
training  contract,  i.e.  to  make  a  credible  commitment  to  provide 
training in the amount agreed with the workers at first stage. Such a 
commitment cannot be verified because training activities taking place 
inside  the  firms  are  in  general  observable,  but  not  verifiable.  This 
property allows the firms to hire workers at low wage pretending to 
offer them training, and then employ them as cheap labour force. The 
firm  can  always  renege  on  its  training  promise even  if  the  worker 




3. LABOUR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM  
 
In this section we define the equilibrium value of labour market 
tightness, the job destruction rate and the level of training. Then we 
consider the socially optimal equilibrium and discuss the relationship 
between hold up and inefficiency of the decentralized equilibrium. 
As  it  is  standard  in  the  matching  literature,  competition  among 
entrant firms will make the ex-ante value of a vacancy equal to zero.  
The firm and worker separate when the match specific productivity 
implies a discounted present value of operational losses higher than T, 
the total firing cost. The amount of training is chosen to maximize the 
firms’ expected discounted profit, after the match is formed and the 
first  period  wage  is  negotiated.    Renegotiation  is  possible  in  the 
second  stage  of  the  employment  relationship  when  the  privately 
optimal level of training has already been chosen.  
 
3.1 Equilibrium  
 
The  equilibrium  amount  of  training  and  threshold  level  of 
productivity below which workers are fired are chosen by the firm to 
maximize  the  value  of  the  stream  of  expected  discounted  profits 
                                                 
4 Similar conclusions are reached if the firm could write a binding contract about training, but workers cannot take enough of 
wage cut to finance it. This happens, for example, in presence of liquidity constraints and/or a  binding legal minimum wage for 
outsider workers.   
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resulting  from  a  new  match.    Define 
d
f !   the  threshold  value  of 
productivity,  the firm’s optimal behaviour implies that: 
 
(11) 
! " ah T s r U s r
d # + # + = ) ( ) (  
 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (11) shows that the 
reservation  productivity  depends  on  the  opportunity  cost  of 
employment to the worker. The firing tax causes firms to lower the 
threshold productivity, and thus to destroy fewer jobs. The returns to 
training,  finally,  reduce  the  threshold  value    as  they  increases  the 
overall productivity of the pair
5.  
Maximizing  the  expected  profits  with  respect  to  training,  firms 
choose the investment level such that that expected marginal return 
equalizes the private marginal cost, then :   
(12) 




















In equation (12) the amount of training depends negatively on the 
separation rate and the share of labour. What drive this result is that 
the first period wage is already fixed when the firm chooses the level 
of training.  In contrast the wage paid in later periods increases in 
training  when  the  Hold-up  implies  a  reduction  of  the  return  to 
investment by the factor  ) 1 ( ! " .The wage negotiated in first stage 
adjusts to share the cost of training between firm and employee, but it 
is  not  considered  a  variable  within  firms’  maximizing  problem 
because it is fixed when the firm chooses the level of training. Once 
the employee has paid a share of the cost of training through wage 
bargaining  in  first  stage,  the  firm  has  no  incentive  to  maintain  is 
training promise.  Wage renegotiation happens in the second stage, 
after training is completed
5.  
The  job  creation  equation is  derived  from  the  asset  value  of    a 
vacant job (3) and the value of a new hire to the firm (1 ) when free 
entry condition  0 = V  holds: 
                                                 
5 Equation (11) can be equivalently derived from: (11’)  T h J
d ! = ) , ( 1 "
. Since the asset value ) , ( 1 h J !
 increases with the 
idiosyncratic component !  , there is a unique threshold value. Given labour market equilibrium both (11) and (11’) mean that 
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This equation indicates that the expected cost of posting a vacant 
job must equalize the expected profit from a starting job. The left-
hand side is the expected cost of a vacancy: it increases with labour 
market  tightness  because  of  matching  externalities.  The  tighter  the 
market, the longer is the expected time to fill a vacancy, and the more 
costly is posting a vacancy. The right-hand side is the expected profits 
from  employing  a  newly  hired  worker.
6  Expected  profits  are 
decreasing with respect to labour market tightness, because a tighter 
labour market increases the exit rate from unemployment and the asset 
value of being unemployed. Increased training and a lower threshold 
productivity increase the right hand side of equation (13).  That is, 
firms’ expected profits would be higher if they could pre-commit to a 
high  level  of  training.      If  such  a  pre-commitment  were  possible, 
workers  would  accept  a  lower  wage  in  the  first  period  of  the 
employment relationship.   Unfortunately for firms and workers, such 
a commitment can not be written into an enforceable contract, because 
no third party can evaluate whether the promised training has actually 
been provided. 
The asset value of being unemployed reduces the right hand side of 
equation  (13)  because  it  exerts  an  upward  wage  pressure  during 
bargaining. Its equilibrium value will be : 
(14) 








where  is  evident  a  positive  linear  relationship  between  the 
unemployment value and the market tightness. At this point the labour 
market equilibrium with flexible wages occurs when equations (13) 
                                                 
6  Note that under wage flexibility, the right hand side of equation (13) is the firms’ share of total surplus evaluated at the first 
stage of the match: ( ) U h E h J h J





and (14) hold and  0 J  assumes the maximum value for a given value 
of being unemployed.  
 
Proposition  1  The  first  order  equations  for  the  maximum 
expected profit , given by equations (11) and (12),the market tightness 
equation (13) and the value of being unemployed (14) are necessary 
and sufficient conditions for an internal local maximum. Then there 
exists an unique internal equilibrium for { }
d h ! ", ,  (see appendix b) 
 
This proposition derives from Kukutani’s fixed point theorem and 
guarantees  that  in  the  labour  market  always  exists  an  unique 
equilibrium associated with appositive separation rate and a positive 
probability to remain unemployed. A corner equilibrium where no lay-
offs occur is also possible, but it relies on the high values of elasticity 
of the training function. Proposition 1 does not imply a clear general 
equilibrium  relationship  between  the  endogenous  variables,  even 
though the envelope properties in the expected profit function implies 
that training always increases with job tenure.   
 
3.3. Hold up and efficiency  
 
The equilibrium equation (12) derives from the assumption that a 
firm-worker pair cannot write a completely enforceable and binding 
contract  to  determine  the  division  of  the  increased  surplus  due  to 
training. Workers and firms, upon meeting, cannot write a contract 
that specifies contingent transfers between themselves, and therefore 
are not able to agree how to share the present discounted value of the 
total surplus of the partnership. 
To evaluate such an inefficiency we calculate the optimal training 
from social point of view, that is the amount of training that would be 
invested if the employer-employee pair maximizes the joint surplus. 
Then  differentiating  the  joint  surplus  of  the  match, 
i.e. ) , ( ) , ( 0 0 0 h E h J S
e e ! ! + = , with respect to h yields : 
 
(15) 























A simple comparison of equation (15) with equation (12) shows the 
under-investment that characterizes both the flexible wage equilibrium 
when the workers’ bargaining power is positive,  0 > ! . The reason 
for such an inefficient outcome is that the firm bears all the cost of 
training during the first stage of the match, but gets only a fraction of 
the  gains  of  the  additional  output  in  the  second  stage,  when  the 
productivity  of  trained  employees  is  increased.  When  the  level  of 
investment is set to maximize the joint surplus the wage rule does not 
matter,  because  it  only  affects  the  division  of  the  surplus  not  its 
magnitude.  
It  is  worth  noting  that  inefficiency  in  the  private  provision  of 
training is  due to hold-up, not to  search externalities. From equation 
(12),  labour  market  tightness  does  not  affect  training,  because  the 
optimal amount is chosen after a match is formed and it is possible to 
revise such a choice. Hold-up causes under-investment and excessive 
lay-offs irrespective of the relationship between workers’ bargaining 
share  and  the  properties  of  the  matching  function.  So  a  welfare 
improving policy may simply aim at increasing training without being 
targeted  to  reduce  search  frictions.  For  this  reason,  hereafter,  we 
assume  that  Hosios  condition  holds,  that  is ) (! " # = ,  where 
) ( / ) ( ) (





4. COMPARATIVE STATICS 
 
In this section the impact of firing penalties and hiring subsidies on 
labour market outcomes is analysed both with flexible wages and rigid 
wages for newly hired. In particular, two types of policy intervention 
are implemented: the first is an economic policy which makes use of 
hiring subsidies to minimize the negative impact of firing taxes on job 
creation incentives, the second is a policy where hiring subsidies play 
no role and firing taxes are pure administrative costs. 
 
                                                 
7 This approach to design a policy can be justified by arguing that since in general search externalities have an ambiguous impact 





4.1. Economic  policy  with  0 > ! .  
 
The aim of hiring subsidies, given to firms which hire workers, is 
to  offset  direct  costs  of  firing  taxes.  It  is  assumed  that  the  public 
budget is balanced, so that the amount of job subsidies is determined  












Equation (16) specifies that the amount of the subsidy depends on 
the average threshold level of productivity, in a symmetric equilibrium 
where all firms optimally choose the same separation rate, 
d d
! ! = . 
Thus the amount !  is given to the firms which hire workers. Under 
these  hypotheses,  the  welfare  of  unemployed  workers  always 
increases if a small firing tax is introduced in a laisser-faire economy. 
In particular the following proposition holds:  
 
Proposition 2 With hiring subsidies,  the introduction of  a small 

















.Thus, a small positive firing penalty causes increased employment, 
productivity and  welfare of unemployed workers  ( see appendix c). 
 
Employment  protection  has  standard  effects  on  firms’ 
maximization behaviour once the match is formed. The introduction 
of  firing  taxes    prolongs  the  expected  duration  of  a  match,  along 
which the returns to training are realized. This tends to augment the 
present  value  of  an  employment  relationship  and  leads  to  more 
training and higher productivity. Specifically, a positive firing tax has 
a positive impact on productivity because it delays separations and 
leads  to  higher  training,  so  that  it  increases  the  welfare  of  the  
employed. On the other hand,  a rise of T increases the expected cost 
of labour services by augmenting the direct cost at separation and, 
indirectly, causes increased bargained wages by improving workers’  
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threat  point.  These  negative  effects  on  firms’  expected  profit 
discourage job creation and hurt the welfare of unemployed.  
With  an  efficient  economic  policy,  however,  the  direct  negative 
effect of T on firms’ profit is neutralized by hiring subsidies while its 
impact on the wages of trained workers will be offset by a reduction in 
the wage of newly hired workers. Moreover, the firing taxes have a 
first order effect on welfare because the social returns to training are 
higher than the private returns, even though the firms do not consider 
the  social  gains  associated  to  their  choice.  That  is,  the  envelope 
property  does  not  hold  when  T  is  introduced  and  the  optimal 
investment increases for a proportion equal to !  . 
 
4.2. Economic policy with   0 = ! . 
 
When there are no hiring subsidies and employment protection is 
pure waste from social point of view, firing taxes maintain the same 
effect on training and job tenure whatever wage setting institution, i.e. 
it always prolongs job tenure and motivates firms to train more. The 
main difference with respect to an efficient policy design regards the 
impact on market tightness and, hence, on the welfare of unemployed 
workers. The next proposition defines the overall impact of firing cost 
on the equilibrium value of job creation, job destruction and training : 
 
Proposition  4  With no hiring subsidies, the introduction of a 












,  while  its  impact  on  equilibrium  market  tightness  and 
unemployed value depends on the elasticity of the training function 
and other parameter values . 
 
Firing costs generate more training and longer job tenure, as in the 
case of efficient policy with hiring subsidies. Equations (11)-(12) react 
with the expected signs to the introduction of firing costs, once the 
match is formed and wage at entry is paid, while the impact on job 
creation differs in terms of sign and magnitude.  
With  flexible  wages,  the  introduction  of  a  small  0 > T     has  a 
positive  effect  on  the  welfare  of  the  unemployed,  because  higher  
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training is associated with higher surplus to be divided, a surplus that 
firms do not take into account when they maximize profits. On other 
hand, the higher costs of labour services are not neutralized by hiring 
subsidies, see equation (13). Thus the overall impact on the market 
tightness  and  the  value  of  being  unemployed  will  depend  on  the 
returns to training and on the other parameter values.  
 
 
5. NUMERICAL EXERCISES 
 
We have just shown that with hiring subsidies the introduction of 
firing taxes leads to clear analytical results in terms of welfare and 
labour market outcomes in a flexible wage equilibrium. In absence of 
hiring subsidies, instead, the relationship between firing tax and the 
value  of  being  unemployed  is  ambiguous.  In  this  section  a 
computational exercise is carried out to provide an example where the 
introduction of a firing tax acts as a Pareto improving policy even with 
no hiring subsidies. The baseline parameters were chosen to guarantee 
that the system of equations (11)-(12)-(13)-(14) converges to a fixed 
point so that emphasis is on the sign rather than the magnitude of the 
results. 
In particular we assume a log-linear specification of the matching 
function, 
! " "
# = A q ) ( , where the scale parameter  0 > A  indicates the 
efficiency of the matching process and !  is the constant elasticity of 
the matching function with respect to unemployment. The distribution 
of idiosyncratic productivity is uniform over a finite support  ] , 0 [ ! , 
i.e.! ~ ) , 0 ( ! unif . The initial values of endogenous variables and the 
baseline parameters are reported in Table 1, where the time period is a 
year.  
The real interest rate and the probability of exogenous separation 
are equal to 0.02 and 0.06 respectively. The labour’s share are fixed to 
0.5, while search externalities are ruled out by imposing the condition 
! " = .  The  critical  value  of  parameter  !   is  such  that  the  second 
order condition on the Hessian matrix holds. Setting  6 . 0 = !  we also 
guarantee that the interior local maximum is the global maximum in 
the  expected  profit  function,  so  that  the  analysis  will  concern  an 
equilibrium where  0 >
d !  and  max h h < .  
18 
 
With regard to the endogenous variables, the market tightness is 
fixed to 0.35 , implying an initial value of being unemployed equal to 
11,75 (see equation 14). The initial amount of training and threshold 
productivity  are  determined  by  equations  (11)  and  (12)  when  the 
upper bound of the idiosyncratic productivity distribution!  is chosen 




 is equal to 
0.25. It is worth to noting that the value of being unemployed and 
average  productivity  for  newly  hired  workers  causes,  in  turn,  a 
parametric restriction on the efficiency of the matching technology, 
the  parameter  A,  and  on  the  parameter  a  of  the  training  function, 
! ah h f = ) ( . Similarly the recruitment cost of posting a vacancy,  k, 
is determined endogenously by the value of a filled job and the exit 
rate from unemployment, taken to be equal to 0.3 . Finally there is 




   
interest rate  r  0.02 
separation rate  s  0.06 
upper productivity support  !   3 
bargaining power  !   0.5 
creation cost   k  1 
training h  1.82 
average productivity 
e !   0.75 
market tightness  !   0.35 
unemployment value U  11.75 
   
            * Baseline parameters and endogenous variables 
 
In  the  search  environment  described  above,  we  consider  the 
introduction of a firing tax  equal to T=0.1, without any compensation 
given to the firms in terms of hiring subsidies. The impact of such a 
policy is  shown in Table 2, where the new  equilibrium  values of 
training  ,  separation  rate,  market  tightness  and  the  welfare  of 
unemployed are reported. In particular the value of being unemployed 
represents  the  target  variable  to  evaluate  the  welfare  improving  
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implications of the firing taxes. Effectively Table 2 confirms that a 
small firing tax could have beneficial effects both for insider workers 









  0.24 
market tightness  !   0.3501 
unemployment value U  17.503 
 
 
In our numerical example the increase of the welfare of employees 
is driven by the increase of job tenure and training, while the increase 
of  the  market tightness  reduce  the  unemployment  duration  and  the 
cost of being unemployed. In other terms, the productivity effect of 
trained  employees  offset  the  higher  cost  of  labour  services  on  the 
firms profit function . This leads the firms to open more vacancies 
and, then, to increase the welfare of unemployed.  
It  is  worth  to  noting,  again,  that  these  results  depend  on  the 
parameterized structure of the model and , in particular, on the chosen 
value of  !  to perform the numerical analysis. On the other hand, in 
the range  6 . 0 0 < <!  the productivity of training investment are not 
high enough to offset the higher expected wage due to fining tax, so 
that  the  introduction  of  1 . 0 = T   reduces  the  market  tightness  and, 
consequently, the welfare of outsider workers. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This  paper  shows  that  inefficiency  induced  by  hold  up  in  the 
private provision of training can justify the introduction of positive 
amount  of  firing  tax  in  economies  populated  by  risk  neutral  or 
perfectly  insured  agents.  Two  main results  are  illustrated.  First,  an 
efficient economic policy, which makes use of  a combination of a 
small  lay-off  taxes  and  hiring  subsidies,  always  increases  
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employment, productivity and welfare. Second, there is not a clear 
relationship between employment protection and welfare when there 
are  no  hiring  subsidies  and  firing  penalties  are  pure  administrative 
costs,.  The  relationship  depends  on  the  concavity  of  the  returns  to 
training and on the parametric specification of the model. In the case 
that the returns to training are high enough, the introduction of firing 
taxes lead to an increase of the firms ‘ expected profit, higher market 
tightness and, as a consequence, higher welfare of being unemployed. 
That  is,  employment  protection  acts  as  a  Pareto  improving  policy. 
Conversely,  when  the  returns  to  training  are  low,  our  analysis 
confirms the standard result of a trade off between adjustment costs 
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Appendix A: Local maximum and firm’s expected profit 
 
Firm maximize their expected profit with respect to training and 




0 ) , (
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! .  The  equilibrium  wage  at 
entry does not vary when firms make their optimal choices, so that the 
































$ & $ & $ ’ $
$
) ( ) (
) 1 )( (
) 1 (
1
)] ( 1 )[ 1 (
1








First order conditions are given by equations (11) and (12) . To find 
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that is: 
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Appendix B: Existence and Uniqueness  
 
1.b)  Existence.  Define  the  four  component  vector 
) , , , ( U h z
d ! " # .  An  equilibrium  is  a  fixed  point  of  the 
correspondence  !  from  z to  z, with  ( ) ) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ) ( z U z z z h z
d ! " = # , 
where  ) (z f !  is defined implicitly by equation (13),  ) (z U f  is defined 
by  equation  (14)  and  ) (z h   and  ) (z
d !   are  chosen  to  maximize 
) , ( 0 h J
e ! . The correspondence  !  is the product of four continuous 
functions on a best response relation. Thus it is convex valued and has 
a  closed  graph.  !   maps  a  convex  compact  set  into  itself,  so  
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Kukutani’s fixed point theorem implies that   !  has a fixed point, 
which is an equilibrium. 
 
Proof.  To  prove  the  continuity  of  functions  in  vector  z  is 
straightforward. The optimal training choice is a continuous function 
















0 ;  then the set 
of  possible  values  of  training  is  compact.  Market  tightness  is  also 
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= ,  so  that  U h U U U ! " < ) , ( 0 # .  Finally 
! ! ! ! ! " < < " ) 0 , ( ) , 0 ( U h
d , where [ ] U L ! ! ,  is the finite support of the 
distribution of the idiosyncratic productivity and  max h  is the maximum 
amount of training. 
 
2.b)  Uniqueness  To  prove  that  the  equilibrium  is  unique, 
consider the firm’s maximization problem with respect to training and 
threshold  productivity.  When  condition  (ii)  is  met,  the  maximized 
expected profit can be represented as function of the equilibrium value 
of  being  unemployed: 
h d
e U U h U MaxJ U J
,
0 0 ) ), ( ), ( ( ) (
!
! = .  ) ( 0 U J   is 





,  so  that  0
) ( 0 <
dU
J d!
.  Considering  the  positive 
monotonic  relation  between  the  equilibrium  market  tightness  and 
workers’ outside option , equation (14), and the continuous positive 
relation  between  !   and  ) ( 0 U J ,  equation  (13),  it  is  verified  that: 
0
)) ( , ( 0 0 <
dU
J J dU !
. Thus there can be only one equilibrium value of 
U and, as a consequence, there is only an equilibrium value of  ! . 
Two  different  solutions  to  ) , (
d h !   would  have  to  give  the  same  
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maximal  ) , ( 0 h J
e !   and  the  same  U .  However  this  result  is  not 
possible since the sum  0 0 E J +  is increasing in h at the equilibrium. 
 
3.b)  Corner  solution.  A  corner  equilibrium  where  no  layoff 
decision  is  taken  and  the  amount  of  training  is  maximum  is  also 
possible  in  the  model.  When  L
d
f ! ! = ,  the  equilibrium  values  of 
training and market tightness are given by equations (12)-(13) :  
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while the value of being unemployed is determined by equation 
(14).  We  note  that  in  equation  (14),  for  0 = ! ,  0 = U ,  and  for 
+! " # ,  max U U = .  In  equation  (13)  for  0 = U ,  0 > ! ,  and  for 





. This implies a decreasing relationship between job 
creation  condition  and  workers’  outside  option  when  L
d ! ! =   and 
max h h = . Thus, there exists a candidate equilibrium { } U h L , , , max ! " . 
 
Appendix C: Comparative Statics 
 
1.c) Hiring subsidy,  0 > !  
 
Differentiating  totally  equations  (11)  (12)  (13),  once  substituted 
equilibrium budget constraint,  T F
d
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f .  Given  that 
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#  so that, on the job 
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Training  is  inversely  related  to the  threshold  productivity,  when 
firing cost varies, i.e.   0
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2.c) No hiring subsidy,  0 = !  
 
With no hiring subsidies, the introduction of firing costs implies on 
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$ .  The  sign  of  the 
market tightness variation is not clear a priori. 
 
 